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When a bank is a relationship lender, its financial health affects the
access to credit of its borrowers. If bank regulators or uninsured 
private depositors might force a bank to close, it will take any action
necessary to remain open. This can lead to inefficient and excessive
foreclosure of the bank’s relationship-based loans to viable borrowers,
or alternatively to the inability to collect existing loans due to its 
fear of recognizing an accounting loss if a loan is called. The level 
of bank capital then has real effects on its borrowers’ access to credit.
A subsidized recapitalization of banks with relationship-based loans
can be a good policy. The size of the recapitalization is critical,
because providing too small an amount of subsidized capital can be
worse than providing no capital. Providing subsidized capital to
banks without relationship-based loans is never a good policy. 
Key words: Bank capital; Recapitalization; Relationship lending;
Banking; Bank failureI. Introduction
When a nation’s banks experience major losses, depositors, the markets, and regulators
respond. The market responds by making it difficult for the bank to raise funds.
Depositors may rush to withdraw funds from the banks. The regulators respond by
closing banks, guaranteeing their liabilities, and/or recapitalizing them. One or more
of these outcomes is inevitable. This paper studies the effects of the regulatory choice
on various parties in the economy.
The most obvious choice to make is whether to let banks fail. Does their inability
to raise sufficient private capital indicate that they are not viable, produce no future
services, and thus should be closed? Because deposits must be fully paid, and not 
renegotiated as in a U.S.-style Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it is possible that the banks 
still add value despite being unable to restructure. This paper analyzes the effects and
desirability of recapitalizing banks, with special focus on the current situation in Japan. 
In Japan, there is a very deep government safety net and substantial regulation
(see Ito and Sasaki [1998] and Hogarth and Thomas [1999] for discussions of bank
capital in Japan). So one approach would be to ignore the markets and analyze bank
recapitalization as a bargaining situation between banks and regulators. However,
there is legislation in Japan that will limit deposit insurance by 2001, and require
prompt corrective action from undercapitalized banks (see Nakaso [1999]). These
changes imply that the discipline of banks may partly rely on market incentives, if
the laws are not delayed and are enforced. As a result, it is important to study the
effects of bank capital on how much they will be able to raise in the market. Even
with total deposit insurance, the banks will need to consider the effects of their credit
rating on what other lines of business they can provide. If the level of capital is not
much above the minimum necessary to stay in business (and this minimum will 
actually be enforced), then banks will need to do whatever it takes to increase their
capital. This “whatever it takes” type of bank behavior could have undesired effects
on the economy.
I focus on the effect of bank recapitalization on banks and their existing borrowers.
The effect on future borrowers (new business development) is ignored, on the basis
that new banks, other recapitalized banks, or even foreign banks could provide such
new relationship-based funding without a subsidized recapitalization of the majority of
existing banks. Recapitalizing a large number of banks is desirable only if it protects the
value of existing relationship lending and the human capital in banks and firms. If it is
just necessary to have a well-capitalized banking system in place for the establishment
of relationships in the future, only a few of the best-managed and healthiest banks
should be recapitalized. The analysis here points out that the recapitalization, and 
its extent, can result in transfers between banks and borrowing firms that can go in
either direction. This occurs because bank capital influences the bargaining between a
bank and its borrowers. In addition, recapitalization can have efficiency effects by
influencing a bank’s decision on whether to foreclose on its defaulted loans.
To keep the argument simple and applicable to Japan, I base the effects of 
capital on the threat of closure by regulators. There are multiple government agencies
that regulate and bargain with banks, and each may have different incentives. For
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at a fixed time in the near future. The results also hold when the threat of closure due
to low capital comes from market participants that may not provide capital or from
potentially uninsured depositors that may withdraw deposits, as in Diamond and
Rajan (2000a), summarized in Diamond and Rajan (2001c). As a result, the analysis
can also be applied to the nearly insolvent insurance companies in Japan that face 
a potential run by policyholders. In addition, see Diamond and Rajan (2000b) for 
an extension to understand the role of short-term debt in the East Asian financial 
crisis of 1997.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure. Section II outlines the
basic argument, without technical details. Section III discusses the effects of a bank’s
capital on its behavior. Section IV discusses the impact of the effect of bank capital
on the way that banks treat their borrowers and on the endogenous payments made
by borrowers. Section V discusses the policy choice trade-offs in choosing how much
capital to provide. Section VI argues that banks without lending relationships and
those with nonviable borrowers should not be recapitalized. Section VII concludes
the paper.
II. A Sketch of the Reasons for and against Recapitalization
The effect of bank capital on bank behavior and borrower welfare depends on charac-
teristics of the borrower and of the bank. The relevant characteristic of the bank is
the presence or absence of relationship lending. I define a relationship lender as one
whose knowledge allows it to induce the borrower to make larger future payments.
As a result, a relationship lender can lend more today than other lenders, and is less
inclined to foreclose on a loan because it can collect more in the future. However, if
the relationship lender is in financial trouble, it may be unable to provide these larger
loans or loan extensions. If instead there is no relationship lending, then a bank’s
financial situation has no effect on the borrower. Another lender can replace an
undercapitalized bank, and the undercapitalized bank can either sell the loan or
accept a payment that the borrower raises from borrowing elsewhere. 
The characteristics of a bank’s borrowers also partly determine the effect and 
desirability of providing subsidized capital to a distressed bank. The relevant borrower
characteristic is the viability of its business. A business is viable if it can commit to pay
the relationship lender more (in present value) than the lender can raise by foreclosing
today. A viable borrower should not lose access to credit, and will not lose its access 
to credit from its bank if the bank is well capitalized. A nonviable borrower should 
lose access to credit, and in many cases a bank will cut off credit to such a borrower
independent of its capital position. I argue that the only case where a subsidized 
recapitalization may be justified is when the undercapitalized bank is one with lending
relationships and viable borrowers. In all other cases, recapitalization is a government
subsidy without social value. Table 1 summarizes the results. A more detailed version
of this table in presented in Table 2 in the conclusion.
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A bank with a valuable lending relationship can induce its borrowers to make larger
payments than other lenders. The relationship lender has what I call a specific loan
collection skill. If a bank has specific loan collection skills, other lenders can collect
only a fraction of future loan proceeds collectable by it (see Diamond and Rajan
[2001a]). As a result, the bank’s relationship-based loans are illiquid. In addition, this
source of illiquidity makes it more difficult for the bank to raise capital than deposits.
It turns out that only a fraction of the present value of future relationship-based loan
collections is capitalized in the market prices of the bank’s capital. The results on rela-
tionship borrowers may apply to keiretsu loans based on long-standing relationships.
The results do not apply, for example, to simple real estate mortgage loans, where
repayment incentives come only from the threat of sale in the market of the real
estate collateral. These are non-relationship loans, discussed in Section VI.
B. Effects of Bank Capital on Bank Behavior
Consider a bank that has developed a lending relationship with a viable borrower.
Results in Diamond and Rajan (2000) show that the level of capital influences the
horizon over which a relationship lender will operate when a borrower’s loans are risky.
A well-capitalized bank will operate with a long horizon, while an undercapitalized
bank will be forced to try to meet its capital requirement. If a bank can get a larger
immediate payment by forcing foreclosure, it may be forced to do so even if it yields a
smaller present value than allowing a borrower more time to pay. An undercapitalized
bank will be unwilling to wait to collect loans over the long run. It may liquidate 
the borrower’s collateral when a better-capitalized bank would let the borrower 
continue to operate. In addition, because it is prone to liquidate, an undercapitalized
bank may be able to extract very large payments from its relationship borrowers. In
effect, such a bank conducts an auction for the right not to be liquidated.
An undercapitalized bank’s incentive to liquidate comes from its need to reduce 
its portfolio of illiquid loans. This will satisfy a capital requirement imposed by the
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Table 1  Desirable and Undesirable Forms of Recapitalization
Financially distressed bank with  Financially distressed bank without  
a relationship borrower a relationship borrower
Borrower is best use  Main case analyzed.
of collateral  Subsidized capital may be socially  No reason to recapitalize.
(and is thus viable) desirable.
A very small recapitalization may  No effect on borrowers of too small 
be worse than no recapitalization  a recapitalization.
at all.
Borrower is not best  No reason to recapitalize unless  No reason to recapitalize.
use of collateral  banks are reluctant to foreclose 
(and is thus not viable) due to effect on accounting 
bank capital.
A very small recapitalization just  No effect on borrowers of too small 
sufficient enough to avoid this  a recapitalization.
reluctance is a good policy.market: for example, the need to avoid the threat of a run by depositors. If the capital
is imposed by regulators and is based on regulatory book capital, then there is an 
offsetting effect that may dominate. Even if foreclosure leads to a larger current 
payment, it may lead to a loss relative to the book value of the loan. For very low 
levels of book capital, relevant to some banks in Japan, the bank would not foreclose
or accept a partial payment because it would cause a writedown in book capital. 
I defer discussion of this “evergreening” effect (where the loan is like a tree that is
green even when frozen in the dead of winter) until the analysis with market value
accounting is complete.
The effects of bank capital identified here are on banks with relationship loans 
to viable borrowers. This approach implies that banks without such loans should 
be allowed to fail. The explicit discussion of this case is deferred to Section VI, after 
I provide more of the details of the types of recapitalization that may be in the 
public interest.
III. Foundations for the Link between Relationships, Illiquidity,
and Bank Capital
I consider a bank with a collateralized loan to a single representative borrower. There
are three dates, 0, 1, and 2. The borrower has substantial bargaining power with the
bank, and can make “take it or leave it” offers to reschedule payments to the bank. As
a result, the bank cannot force the borrower to pay more than the value for which it
can liquidate the collateral. This is assumed only for simplicity. So long as the
amount that a lender can collect is an increasing function of the value the lender
obtains from liquidation, qualitatively similar results will follow.
If there is no lending relationship, the loan is worth the same amount to any
lender, and can be sold for that amount. Equivalently, the borrower can approach a
new lender who will lend up to the value of the loan (which may be less than book
value), allowing the borrower to change banks. If a lending relationship exists, then
lenders other than the relationship bank will be able to redeploy the collateral only
for a lower value, and will not lend as much to the borrower (or buy its loans for 
full value). But relationship lending introduces other considerations, so we defer 
its discussion.
Most of the issues involving the costs and benefits of recapitalizing banks are
related to intertemporal effects, and the effects of capital on the bank’s horizon. It is
important first to show why the fractions of bank demand deposits and capital 
matter at all. I begin with a single-period example under certainty to demonstrate
why they matter (using the ideas developed in Diamond and Rajan [2001a]). 
A. Relationship Lending
When the bank is a relationship lender, it is the only lender that can force the 
borrower to the maximum value based on its foreclosure threat. Other lenders can
collect less. For simplicity only, I assume that other lenders would collect zero if they
negotiated the loan.
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cannot raise the full value of the loan by issuing capital (i.e., non-demandable claims)
today. This is because the relationship lender’s specific skills are needed to extract
repayment from the borrower. The only sanction available to outside capital holders
is to dismiss the banker with replacement by a less-qualified banker. This threat is
very costly to carry out. Without the original banker, outsiders (holders of capital) or
replacement bankers cannot get as much from the borrower. So the original relation-
ship lender can, and will, appropriate a rent for his specific skills. For application to
banks with many employees, assume that the relationship lender’s rent takes the form
of excessive employment of bankers. Assuming that he extracts half the additional
amount he recovers from the borrower, the relationship lender will keep a rent of
one-half in excess employment costs and only pass on the other half to outside 
holders of capital. The relationship lender can thus sell the loan or issue capital
against it for only a fraction of present value of the payments that he can collect. 
If there were no relationship, and anyone could collect the full amount of the loan, 
it would be liquid, and the bank could issue capital up to the full value of the 
loan. With such a liquid loan, outside capital holders would replace the bankers
unless they cut employment costs, and the bankers would not be able to threaten 
to earn a rent.
B. Discipline from the Threat of a Bank Run
Suppose instead that the relationship lender (henceforth the banker) finances illiquid
loans by issuing uninsured demandable deposits. These cannot be renegotiated next
period without triggering a run, which removes the loan from the banker’s control.
Because of the “first come, first served” aspect of uninsured demand deposits, no
depositor would want to make a concession if the bank still had assets. Each deposi-
tor could force the bank to sell assets to pay in full (until the bank runs out of assets).
And once the loan is sold, the banker can earn no rents (as shown in Diamond and
Rajan [2001a]). The banker will always pay deposits if feasible. If the level of deposits
and capital is set when it is known that the banker can collect exactly 1 from a 
borrower, the problem with a riskless loan’s illiquidity can be solved: set deposits
equal to 1 and capital equal to zero. The banker will pay out the full 1, and will be
forced to cut employment to the efficient level. However, when loans are risky, a 
significantly positive level of capital is needed unless the probability of bank failure is
to be very large. With a positive level of capital, the illiquidity problem will remain.
The problem is that demand deposits are a very rigid form of financing. This is good 
in that it disciplines the banker and enables him to commit to pay out. It is bad 
if there is any uncertainty in bank asset values because a drop in bank asset values 
will precipitate a run, disintermediating the banker, and further reducing their value.
Capital can act as a buffer in such cases because, unlike deposits, its value adjusts 
to underlying asset values. Only a fraction of the amount that the banker can collect
on the loan can be committed to pay to outside investors. Rather than introduce
uncertainty that leads to the need for some capital, I will just look at the effects 
of using some capital to fund the bank under certainty. This will illustrate the 
qualitative effects of bank capital on bank behavior. Specifically, when there is 
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the bank may involve some capital in addition to demand deposits. In the rest of 
the paper, we will assume there is a capital requirement of γ for banks, specified 
by regulatory authorities, based on unmodeled uncertainty about asset values.
C. Discipline from the Threat of Closure Due to Capital Requirements
An effect similar to the threat of runs occurs with insured deposits, if the deposit
insurer requires prompt corrective action to enforce a minimum level of capital (and
sticks by this threat to close the bank unless it raises sufficient capital). When the
deposit insurer and the remainder of the government are prohibited from providing
subsidized capital to the bank, the bank is under the same incentives as the threat of a
run, and rents are an increasing function of the amount of capital required. Consider
a bank with a given level of capital. If it incurs losses beyond a given amount, its
uninsured depositors will run, closing the bank. If the same loss leads regulators to
close the bank, then the incentives are identical. 
Suppose that the bank is closed if its capital is below one-ninth of the bank’s 
market value (γ = 1 – 9). Because the banker takes as a rent one-half of the excess
amount over the amount of deposits, the total market value of the bank that can 
collect P2 at date 2 and has deposits D2 ≤ P2 is given by  D2 +
1 – 2(P2 – D2) = 1 – 2 (P2 +
D2). Thus, with certainty and an all-deposit bank, the value of the bank is 
equal to the full value of the loans, or P2. With a capital requirement that capital
(worth 1 – 2 (P2 – D2)) equals a fraction γ of total bank value [ 1 – 2 (P2 + D2)], total 
bank value is equal to P2/(1 + γ ). The banker’s rent becomes [γ /(1 + γ )]P2, and 
the value of capital is also equal to [γ /(1 + γ )]P2 (because capital and the banker 
share the surplus equally). 
Enforced minimum capital requirements make insured deposits a hard “budget
constraint” on bankers by committing the deposit insurer not to allow excess 
rents to the bankers. An all-capital structure provides no discipline because there is
no threat of closure, but once there are some deposits, a required level of capital 
provides discipline by forcing closure if the bank’s total value paid to outsiders 
falls sufficiently. Although this is consistent with other views of minimum capital
requirements as providing discipline to bankers by committing regulators to close
insolvent banks, it provides a somewhat different perspective. If the level of capital
above the minimum is too much above the minimum level, the banker will be free to
appropriate rents and excessive costs from capital, to the extent that the bankers 
provide a loan collection service not available elsewhere. Excess capital only influ-
ences the rents of banks that do relationship lending, when capital owners are free to
replace bankers with poor lending performance. A replacement banker, or another
bank selected to service the loan, could collect non-relationship loans equally well as
the originating banker.
Without a required minimum capital requirement, the regulator can allow the
bank to operate with negative capital, and raise additional insured deposits to cover
excessive costs. As a result, the deposit insurer could in principle give an unlimited 
subsidy to banks. Such a deposit insurer would be forced to make as large a concession
(0.5) as an all-capital bank (and probably would make an even larger concession).
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must close the bank if capital is too low, and cannot provide capital of its own, then
there is no negotiation with the deposit insurer that will yield the bank a larger 
concession than just negotiating with capital. Negotiations must then be with capital.
Capital will make concessions, but not the depositors or their insurer. The value that
can go to outsiders as a whole is the value of deposits plus one-half the excess over
this amount that the banker can collect. If the deposits exceed what the banker can
collect, then the bank fails, and the borrower pays half the amount that the banker
could collect, and the deposit insurer covers the rest. 
With certainty and a minimum capital ratio of γ , a bank with a relationship loan
worth P2 has a market value of P2/(1+γ ).
D. Capital Value
Consider a loan with payments P1 at date 1 and P2 at date 2. Suppose that the banker
can actually collect these amounts (the borrower has this much cash at each date and
the bank can force the borrower to pay this much). Any other lender cannot force the
borrower to pay (can collect only zero). 
If the banker threatened to quit (and not use relationship skills to collect the loan)
at date 2, capital holders would get zero on their own, and by splitting the surplus
with the banker they get 1 – 2(P2 – D2). If the bank is to meet its date 2 capital require-
ment, its maximum date 2 market value is thus P2/(1 + γ ) = 9 – 10P2. The total value of
the claim to capital is [γ /(1+ γ )]P2 = 1 – 10P2.
If date 1 maturing deposits, minus date 1 loan payments, were to exceed P2/(1 +
γ ), then the bank would have no way to pay them all, and the bank would be closed
due to insolvency (negative capital). The bank can issue appropriate quantities of
capital and deposits to meet its obligations and continue with a proper capital
requirement in this case. 
At date 1, the bank could pay up to P1 + P2/(1+ γ ) to outside investors (depositors
plus holders of capital). Because the bank can threaten to quit before date 1, the
amount that the bank can commit to pay to holders of capital at date 1 is less than this. 
Suppose that the bank has date 1 deposits of D1, and the banker threatens to quit,
and not represent the capital holders this period, and not collect P1. If this breaks the
relationship, a capital holder would get zero at date 2 as well. Alternatively, if the
bank were closed due to low capital if the date 1 payment were set to zero, then even
without breaking the relationship, the capital holder gets zero without the banker,
and this analysis applies. For the capital holder to have a positive outside option
requires very high initial capital (see the Appendix). Unless deposits are very low, the
capital holder could get only zero unilaterally. So if the banker got the entire surplus,
the capital holder would get zero. If instead the capital holder got the entire surplus,
instructing the banker to collect P1 now and raise P2/(1 + γ ) with new deposits and
capital, the capital holder would get P1 – D1 + P2/(1 + γ ). Capital and the banker
divide the surplus equally, and as a result, the value of capital before date 1 is the
average of these, or
1 – 2[P1 +P2/(1+γ ) –D1].
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γ , or 
1            P2 –– P1 + –––– – D1 2 ( 1+γ )
γ > –––––––––––––––––.
1            P2 D1 + –– P1 + –––– – D1 2 ( 1+γ )
In terms of D1, deposits must not exceed
P1(1–γ 2) +P2(1–γ ) –––––––––––––––––––,
(1+ γ )
2
or the bank will not be able to meet its capital requirement. This is the limit on the
total market value of a bank before date 1, if it must meet its capital requirement on
each date. For γ = 1 – 9, this capital requirement before date 1 is satisfied if and only if
D1 ≤ 0.8P1 + 0.72P2. More distant payments are less reflected in capital value, because
they give more bargaining power to the banker. If D1 exceeds this amount the bank
must close, because the bank has no way to recapitalize sufficiently.
To generalize, suppose that the borrower will make a payment of P0 on the date
that the capital requirement must be met. It can be used to pay down loans and
reduce deposits, and the bank will be able to meet its current capital requirement if 
P1(1–γ 2) +P2(1–γ ) ––––––––––––––––––– ≥ D1 –P0.  (1+ γ )
2
IV. Endogenous Payments and Bank Foreclosure
The analysis of minimum capital requirements to this point has taken the payments
from the borrower as given, and determined whether the bank will remain open. The
borrower’s cash holdings on each date, the constraints imposed by minimum capital
on the banker’s ability to respond to default, and the bank’s control rights (i.e., the
right to call the loan and foreclose absent a current default) are all important. 
If the bank has no liquidation rights over the borrower absent default, then 
obviously the borrower will pay no larger amounts than the contracted amounts, 
P1 and P2. An undercapitalized bank must close. But the borrower may be unable to
make these payments if short of cash, for example, if the cash on date 1 is less than
P1. In addition, the borrower may choose not to pay over all of his cash, because he
anticipates that the bank will accept less, and not foreclose.
A. The Bank’s Value Obtained from Liquidation (Foreclosure)
At date t, an entrepreneur’s project produces a cash flow of Ct, and the relationship
lender’s liquidation value just before that date is Xt. Suppose for a moment that 
the capital requirements do not influence the relationship lender’s behavior toward
the borrower. We determine through backward induction how payments will be
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are needed to operate the borrower’s firm. I assume that the borrower can credibly
threaten not to produce that period’s cash, at either date 1 or date 2, unless the bank
makes a concession. Suppose at date 2 that the borrower defaults and refuses to make
the pre-specified payment P2 and, instead, makes an offer of a lower payment. Once
the borrower defaults, the lender has the right to liquidate. If the bank rejected the
offer and did not liquidate, no cash would be produced at all. In response, the rela-
tionship lender can accept the offer or reject it and liquidate the assets to obtain X2.
Thus if P2 exceeds X2, the entrepreneur will renegotiate. At date 2, the entrepreneur
will pay min[P2,X2]. 
Now consider what happens at date 1. The borrower at date 2 will credibly
threaten not to produce that period’s cash unless the bank makes a concession (offer-
ing a lower payment). If the borrower makes this threat and offers a lower payment,
the lender can accept the offer. Alternatively, the lender can reject it and liquidate
immediately and get X1, or reject it and hold on to the asset and get X2 at date 2. 
In this last case, no date 1 cash is produced, but the lender gets X2 at date 2. So 
the lender will accept any offer to renegotiate that makes its payments amounting 
to max[X1,X2] over dates 1 and 2, where any payment left for date 2 should be
enforceable, i.e., should be less than X2. If the promised payments P1 + P2 exceed
max[X1,X2], they will be renegotiated down to this level. If the borrower is short of
cash, and can pay less than max[X1,X2], the lender will liquidate.
When the bank lender must meet its capital requirement, it can constrain 
the bank’s ability to follow this loan negotiation policy. If the borrower defaults
(threatens not to produce cash) before date 1, and makes an offer that the bank turns
down, the bank can get X1 by liquidating at date 1 (and nothing at date 2: this is
equivalent to a loan that pays P0 = 0, P1 = X1, and P2 = 0), can get X2 by liquidating at
date 2 (and nothing at date 1: equivalent to a loan with P0 = P1 = 0 and P2 = X2). 
If the bank will be closed before date 1 if P0 = P1 = 0 and P2 = X2, the bank does not
have the freedom to wait to reject a borrower’s offer and wait to collect X2 by date 2
liquidation. Thus, an undercapitalized bank may have a short horizon. The bank will
have a short horizon if it can survive with immediate foreclosure or P0 = 0, P1 = X1,
and P2 = 0, but not with an excused default or P0 = P1 = 0 and P2 =X2.
In addition to limiting a bank’s ability to wait to foreclose after rejecting a 
borrower’s offer of partial payment, low capital can limit the types of offers that the
bank can accept from the borrower. To meet the capital requirement on a date before
date 1, the borrower’s offer must make immediate payment of P0, and date 1 and 2
payments of P1 and P2, respectively, that satisfy 
P1(1– γ 2) +P2(1–γ ) ––––––––––––––––––– ≥ D1 –P0.  (1+γ )
2
In addition, the offer must satisfy P0 + P1 + P2 ≥ X1, or the bank will prefer to 
foreclose at date 1. If the bank is free to reject and wait until date 2 to liquidate,
which requires that X2(1– γ )/(1+ γ )
2 ≥ D1, then an acceptable offer must also satisfy
P0 + P1 + P2 ≥ X2, or the bank will reject it to wait to collect X2 at date 2. If the 
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2], I will call 
the bank undercapitalized.
The level of initial capital, a decreasing function of D1, determines how the bank
will respond to a default. Suppose that the borrower has defaulted on the original
deal, and the bank has the right to foreclose. What offers can the bank accept, 
and how much can the bank force the borrower to pay? An example will illustrate 
this point.
B. Example
Assume that the capital requirement is γ = 1 – 9, that X1 = 0.99, and that X2 = 1.
If the borrower defaults before date 1, and the bank rejects the borrower’s offer,
then if D1 > 0.72, the bank cannot wait until date 2 to foreclose, but can survive by
date 1 foreclosure if D1 ≤ 0.8.
The banker would like the largest total payment, but the capital shortage requires
that any acceptable offer must satisfy P0 + 0.8P1 + 0.72P2 ≥ D1.
Suppose that D1 = 0.8. The borrower cannot commit to pay more than 1 at 
date 2. To avoid foreclosure by the bank, P0 + 0.8P1 + 0.72(1) ≥ 0.8, or P0 + 0.8P1
≥ 0.08. If the borrower has less than this, the bank must foreclose.
Suppose that the borrower is subject to liquidation before date 1. The borrower
may have some cash. If the borrower offers no immediate payment before date 1,
then for the bank to remain open, 0.8P1 + 0.72(1) ≥ D1 (in addition to P1 + P2 ≥ X1),
or for D1 = 0.8 and P2 ≤ 1, there must be P1 ≥ 0.1. The bank will require a high 
interest rate, and not to cover default risk. If an earlier payment—call it P0—is 
possible, then the constraint is P0 + 0.8P1 + 0.72(1) ≥ D1 (in addition to P0 + P1 + P2 ≥
X1). If the borrower cannot meet this, then the bank will foreclose. 
For the example with X1 = 0.99, X2 = 1 and an outstanding default, the bank 
will liquidate before date 1 if  P0 + 0.8P1 + 0.72(1) ≥ D1 = 0.8, or C0 + 0.8P1 ≤ 0.8. In
addition, the borrower will pay as rapidly as possible. The total amount paid is then
[0.8 – (C0 +C1/0.8)]/0.72.
This interesting case arises when the bank will fail to meet its capital requirement
if it does not liquidate, but will not if it does. This means if the borrower pays zero at
date 1, the bank will liquidate, although it can collect more by waiting. The bank
will do whatever it takes to stay open. This is “whatever it takes” behavior. It gives the
banker a very short horizon, and makes it act as if it discounts future cash flows at a
very high rate. The bank must meet all obligations without violating its capital
requirement on date 1.
This desperation of the banker either leads to liquidation or changes the amount
that it forces a liquidity-constrained borrower to pay. Moreover, the bank’s ability to
extract payment from the borrower does not change monotonically in its capital and
depends on the borrower’s project characteristics (such as the interim cash flows it
generates). Before further analyzing the effects of capital on the bank’s ability to get
the borrower to pay at date 1, it is helpful to examine what the bank will do when
the borrower has no date 1 cash, and must pay zero at date 1. 
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If the representative borrower has no cash at date 1 or date 0, but will have cash at
date 2, the banker would like to wait until date 2 to collect X2 = 1. However, the
most the bank can raise on date 1 against the date 2 loan collection is 0.72. The bank
can raise 0.99 by liquidating before date 1. The bank’s decisions are as follows.
(1) If the bank is well capitalized (has initial date 1 maturing deposits of 0.72 or
less), the bank will not liquidate, but will wait until date 2, collect 1, and will
be able to meet its date 1 capital requirement.
(2) If the bank is undercapitalized (has deposits in excess of 0.72 to pay on date 1,
but less than 0.99), the bank will (inefficiently) liquidate the borrower’s collat-
eral. It would not be able to meet its capital standard otherwise. By liquidating,
the bank can raise 0.99, pay down deposits, and meet the capital standard. So
long as deposits are less than 0.99, the bank can avoid failure at date 1. 
(3) If the bank is severely undercapitalized (deposits exceed 0.99), the bank fails 
at date 1. The borrower faces liquidation, because it can offer no cash to avoid it. 
D. Bargaining with a Borrower with Lots of Cash
Any borrower who has date 0 cash of 0.99 will pay it, and an undercapitalized bank
that cannot wait until date 2 to collect will be forced to accept it as total payment on
the loan. In general, the borrower will pay early cash when the bank is desperate and
charges a very high interest rate to continue loans. Any borrower who can set 
P1(1– γ 2) +P2(1–γ ) ––––––––––––––––––– ≥ D1 –P0 (1+γ )
2
while P0 + P1 + P2 = X1 will be able to get an undercapitalized bank to accept X1 in
total, even when X2 is greater. The borrower gets a discount, because the bank has a
high rate of discount on future payments.
E. Example
The borrower would like to pay down the loan as soon as possible when the bank
charges very high rates to abstain from liquidation. A borrower who can pay C0
immediately plus pay X1 – C0 at date 1 such that 0.8(X1 – C0) + C0 ≥ D1 will be able
to benefit from the bank’s desperation. For example, if D1 = 0.8, then 0.8(0.99 – C0)
+C0 ≥ 0.8 implies that ifC0 ≥ 0.4 andC1 ≥ 0.59, then the borrower can make a total 
payment of 0.99 and have it accepted. If C0 < 0.4, then the borrower’s total payment
must exceed 0.99, because higher date 1 or 2 payments that satisfy C0 + 0.8(P1) +
0.72(P2) ≥ D1 must then exceed X1 in sum. For borrowers with high cash:
(1) If the bank is well capitalized (has initial date 1 maturing deposits of 0.72 or 
less), the bank is free to wait until date 2, collect 1, and the borrower will pay 
1 in total.
(2) If the bank is undercapitalized (has deposits in excess of 0.72 to pay on date
1, but less than 0.99), the bank cannot reject an offer and wait until date 2 to 
collect, because it will violate its capital standard. The borrower will pay 0.99 
in total.
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must fail at date 1. The borrower faces liquidation but may be able to 
negotiate a settlement after the bank fails if immediate cash C0 is sufficient 
(if C0 > X1/2 = 0.4545).
F. An Intermediate Amount of Cash
Because the bank can raise at most 0.72 without liquidating, the undercapitalized
bank will have constraints on its behavior at date 1. In particular, there is an effect on
the banker’s horizon when bargaining with borrowers. If the bank responds to default
by waiting until date 2 to liquidate, then it will be closed. Any borrower that wants
to avoid immediate liquidation will need to offer a positive date 1 payment. This can
force the borrower to pay more than the value of the bank’s liquidation threat. A 
borrower with date 0 cash of exactly D1 – 0.72, and no date 1 cash, would need to
pay all the date 0 cash to the bank, plus allow the bank to collect all that it can at
date 2 (1). As borrowers have more cash, they can reduce their total payment, taking
advantage of the undercapitalized bank’s desperation. Borrowers with date 0 cash of
less than D1 – 0.72 meet the fate of the borrower with no date 1 cash: immediate 
liquidation. We here consider borrowers with date 0 cash in excess of D1 – 0.72, but
less than enough to get the bank to settle for X1 in total. 
This implies the following characterization when the borrower has this inter-
mediate amount of date 1 cash.
(1) If the bank is well capitalized (has initial date 1 maturing deposits of 0.72 
or less), the bank will collect a total of X2 = 1 from the borrower, and will 
not liquidate.
(2) If the bank is undercapitalized (has deposits in excess of 0.72 to pay on date
1, but less than 0.99), the borrower will satisfy C0 + 0.8(P1) + 0.72(P2) = D1,
where P2 = min{0, (D1 –C0 – 0.8C1)/0.72} and P1 = min{C1, (D1 –C0)/0.8}.
Given the example where D1 = 0.8, if C0 = 0 and C1 ∈ ((0.08)/0.8, 0.99) =
(0.1, 0.99), the borrower will pay all of its date 1 cash to the bank, plus offer a
positive payment to the bank at date 2 to allow the bank to meet its capital
requirement without liquidation. The total payment by the borrower declines
monotonically from 1.1 to 0.99 as cash C1 increases from 0.1 to 0.19. The
trick here is that the borrower cannot commit to pay more than 0.99 at date 1
if it has sufficient cash at that time.
If C1 = 0, but C0 > 0, then the total payment goes from 1.08 to 1 as C0
goes from 0.08 to 0.27. (and down to 0.99 asC0 increases to 0.31149).
(3) If the bank is severely undercapitalized,  D1 > X1 = 0.99, the bank fails. After
the bank fails, the borrower is liquidated if C0 <
1 – 2X1 = 0.4545, and pays
0.4545 otherwise to avoid liquidation. 
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Undercapitalization Leads to Closure
What is a government to do? The well-capitalized bank makes appropriate decisions,
but may collect less from borrowers with a moderate amount of current cash. The
undercapitalized bank will squeeze cash-poor borrowers, break mutually beneficial
relationships with very low cash borrowers, and collect less than the maximum
amount that it can from liquid borrowers. Severely undercapitalized banks face
immediate closure.
A government that cares about preserving the banking system itself would be very
tempted to add at least enough capital to prevent immediate closure. But what is the
effect on the borrower, the corporate sector, employment, and growth? If the bank
fails, then there will be bargaining such that the borrower can be forced to pay
0.4545 (half of X1, because the government will be forced to hire the banker to 
collect the loan), or face immediate liquidation. If the borrower has sufficient date 1
cash (at least 0.4545), then the borrower would benefit from the bank’s failure,
because it has little future value in its relationship and can get rid of its debt burden
more cheaply if the bank fails. However, this case is quite unlikely. If the borrower
has less cash, the borrower will be liquidated if the bank fails, but with only one-half
the proceeds to depositors and the government deposit insurer. The corporate sector
will be very anxious to have the bank recapitalized in this case if its cash is just below
0.4545. How much recapitalization it will desire depends on how much cash it has.
If it has enough date 1 cash to frontload the payment to the bank, so that its total
value and its pledgible value are close to 0.99, then a small recapitalization is desired.
The borrower could avoid the liquidation threat by making date 1 payments and
small date 2 promises to the bank. If the borrower has too little cash to do this, a
large recapitalization is desired. 
Once the bank has been given enough capital to be well capitalized, any addi-
tional capital will transfer rents to the banker and reduce the rate of return received
by the government. Too small a recapitalization (from severely undercapitalized to
undercapitalized) may be bad, because it does not prevent inefficient foreclosure.
This is especially true if the borrowers are short on cash. It is a bit outside the model,
but it can be less expensive for a government that wants to avoid inefficient liquida-
tion to give banks a smaller amount of capital, and give the firms cash to pay the
banks. This reduces the banker’s rents and protects the human capital in firms.
However, it requires the government to know which firms are viable but short on
cash. This seems unlikely, but is outside the model. Too large a recapitalization will
not lead to inefficient loan decisions, but will lead to inefficient operations in the
bank and increase the cost to the government. 
A. Evergreening and Loss of Bargaining Power When Book Capital Is Inaccurate
Suppose that if a bank exercised its liquidation threat, its book capital would fall 
sufficiently to force immediate closure. The bank will never foreclose in this situation.
This protects the borrower from foreclosure, but implies that the borrower will not
have an incentive to pay the bank at all. If the borrower is the efficient user of the firm’s
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economic capital of the bank. For borrowers with nonviable businesses, and which
should be liquidated for efficiency, this delays efficient redeployment of capital, and
increases the losses to the banking system, due to lost bargaining power. 
This case occurs when deposits exceed X1, the amount that the bank can get 
from liquidation, but the regulators do not measure capital as this low, so long 
as the loan is not written down in the accounts. Such banks are in the severely 
undercapitalized category in the examples. 
In the model outlined above where the borrower is viable and thus the best user of
the firm’s capital, bank recapitalization sufficient to avoid evergreening can be a free
lunch for the government. This occurs if the borrower has sufficient cash to reach a
negotiated settlement with the bank, worth at least X2. If the bank evergreens and
then fails, the borrower will end up paying a very small amount (one-half of what the
bank could liquidate for, or one-half of X1). By recapitalizing the bank sufficiently 
to have it negotiate a larger payment (equal to the full liquidation value), the 
government can save the deposit insurer money. The real decision is the same, but
the borrower pays more. This saves money for the deposit insurer.
Once enough capital has been advanced to allow a negotiated settlement, the
analysis in the remainder of the paper applies. The results imply that if the borrower
is short of date 1 cash, a small recapitalization which is just enough to avoid 
evergreening (to D1 = 0.99 and leaves the bank undercapitalized) is a bad policy. 
An undercapitalized bank will liquidate inefficiently, and the borrower and society
are worse off than if the bank had received no capital and continued to be afraid to
liquidate. If the government provides this small amount of capital and borrowers are
cash poor, the borrower will lobby the government for relief. It will ask for cash or for
the government to force the banks to convert some debt into equity, reducing the
amount that the banks obtain from liquidation. This position has been taken by 
the Japan Federation of Economic Organizations (Keidanren); see Rowley (1999).
Viable borrowers would be less afraid of a bank recapitalization if the bank were well
capitalized (D1 < 0.72).
B. The Intertemporal Problem with Repeated Government Recapitalization
Government recapitalization leads to a classic time-consistency problem. If the
deposit insurer cannot put capital into banks, but can only allow them to stay in
business without recapitalization, then there is a limit on the concessions that can 
be extracted from deposit insurers over the short term. However, anticipations of 
the closure behavior of regulators can give bankers perverse current incentives. If a
period of persistent undercapitalization exists, then a government would wish to 
provide a subsidized recapitalization. If the future closure policy were unchanged, 
this could make all parties in the economy better off (protecting human and physical
capital). The government would exert a bad influence if it generated a belief that 
a recapitalization were always forthcoming. That would eliminate liquidity creation
by banks and lead to large future government expenditure on bank bailouts. Use of
political constraints to recapitalize banks only when called for by external conditions,
and not banker rent taking or incompetence, would be desirable. However, 
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recapitalization will lead to rents to banker human capital (overemployment, 
excessive costs, and resistance to change). It is therefore very appropriate that the
Japanese recapitalization has been accompanied by both a promise of commitment 
to future prompt corrective action, employment reduction, and improved portfolio
disclosure and valuation. 
VI. Banks That Should Not Be Recapitalized
A. A Bank with No Relationship Lending
The financial health of a bank without lending relationships is of no consequence to
the borrower. Such a bank can sell loans to meet the requirement, and the sale or
retention of loans is of no consequence to the borrower. If the value of capital is 
negative, then the bank will not be able to recapitalize without subsidized capital, 
but again this is of no consequence to the borrower. The decision to liquidate or to
continue lending is independent of the identity of the lender.
B. A Nonviable Borrower
A nonviable borrower is one whose current management is not the best user of the
firm’s capital, and as a result the lender can collect more by foreclosure than by 
continuing to lend. If there is no lending relationship, this just means that anyone
can collect more from foreclosure, implying that independent of the capital position
of a bank there will be foreclosure after default. In this case, the only value of recapi-
talization is to avoid evergreening that prevents loans from being foreclosed, but such
liquidation could be achieved by a government agency which foreclosed on the loans,
perhaps hiring bankers from the failed bank. There is no long-run value to retaining
relationships to nonviable borrowers.
VII. Summary and Conclusion
The analysis presented here suggests that for banks with viable lending relationships,
it may be a good policy to recapitalize banks until they are well capitalized. Two bad
policies are recapitalizing them only to the point where they are willing to write off
loans (stop the evergreening policy), or to the undercapitalized point where they
avoid failure only by liquidating the collateral of viable borrowers. These policies
make sense only if some cash is provided to borrowers by the government, or the
banks are forced to extend the viable loans in return for receiving the capital. But
these policies of multiple-level bailouts by the government would require more 
information and long-run commitment than a government possesses. 
Providing too much capital to the banks will leave them with rents, which in the
Japanese context means too large a wage bill and continued inefficient operations.
The government thus faces a difficult problem. Too little capital may be worse than
none, and too much will be wasted. It is appropriate in this context that the capital 
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management plans. However, nothing focuses the mind on rent reduction as much 
as the threat of impending closure.
The recent recapitalization has come in two stages, and some suggest that more
stages might be forthcoming. Given the time-consistency problem, repeated 
recapitalization can cause problems. Guaranteed future recapitalization is equivalent
to an all-capital bank. This leads to maximum rents and destroys liquidity creation.
Finally, the analysis has focused on banks with valuable relationships, whose 
borrowers are still viable. Banks not in this category should be closed. Without a 
relationship, a change in capital will not change a bank’s incentive to inefficiently
foreclose, so there is no extra efficiency gain from recapitalizing them. If the bank has
a relationship, but the borrowers are not viable, then efficient allocation of capital
requires that their collateral be liquidated and redeployed. Absent accounting-based
reluctance to foreclose, the banks would have every incentive to liquidate such 
borrowers, even if undercapitalized. If evergreening is the issue, recapitalizing the
bank slightly could be sensible, but just for the purpose of closing it very soon 
thereafter. Alternatively, if the bank’s extra efficiency of liquidating those loans is
small, then just closing it and transferring collection to the Resolution and Collection
Corporation will be the best choice. These results are summarized in Table 2.
This analysis is just a first step in the study of the optimal amount of recapitaliza-
tion to provide to banks. There is much to add to make the results robust. However,
I am not aware of any other theoretically based analysis of this topic, so it is impor-
tant to begin with this first step. It is clear that recapitalization by the government
has time-consistency problems if it is expected to continue in the future. To my
mind, however, this is not an argument against the current recapitalization. When
(nearly) all the banks are underwater, it is desirable to recapitalize at least some of
them. We need a framework to determine which ones are provided with subsidized
capital, and how much to provide.
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Table 2  Details of Desirable and Undesirable Forms of Recapitalization
Financially distressed bank with  Financially distressed bank without  
a relationship borrower a relationship borrower
Borrower is best  Main case analyzed.
use of collateral  Provide subsidized capital to well-  No reason to recapitalize.
(and is thus viable) capitalized level unless borrowers have 
substantial cash. Will not liquidate inefficiently.
Providing just enough capital to end  Recapitalization just to the level to 
fear of writing off loans due to book  avoid fear of writing off loans 
capital problems (“evergreening”) is  due to book capital problems 
worse than providing no capital. (“evergreening”) has no effect.
Borrower is not  Undercapitalized bank will liquidate No reason to recapitalize.
best use of  (efficiently) unless subject to the 
collateral (and is  “evergreening” effect on book capital.   Recapitalization just enough to 
thus not viable) Recapitalization just sufficient enough  avoid “evergreening” leads to 
to avoid “evergreening” is a good policy.  efficient foreclosure. Equivalent to 
More capital has no beneficial effect. transferring loans to an outside 
collection agency (Resolution and 
Collection Corporation).APPENDIX: BANK LOAN COLLECTION AT HIGH LEVELS OF 
CAPITAL
If the relationship is not broken by not collecting this period and the bank has 
substantial capital, the borrower can pay zero this period and face liquidation by the
banker next period. If the bank is not closed in this scenario, then the capital holders
can get X2/(1 + γ ) – D1 unilaterally, and respect the capital requirement by reducing
deposits if needed by selling added claims to capital. The condition for the banker
not being closed in this scenario is that the bank meets the capital requirement with
P1 =0 ,  o rD1 ≤ [γ /(1+ γ )]X2. This is a high level of date 1 capital, and will not be of
interest. If the bank has this much capital, then the value of capital is then 
1            P2 X2 –– P1 + –––– – D1 + –––– – D1. 2 ( 1+γ )    1+γ
In this case, if P2 =X2, the value of capital on date 1 is 1 – 2P1 +P2/(1+ γ ) – D1.
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